7 ways to stop infiltration & co-optation of Canadian research by hostile authoritarian states

Dr. Christian Leuprecht, Professor, Royal Military College of Canada

(Testimony at Canada’s House of Commons Standing Committee on Science & Research on June 20, 2023)

Mr. Chair, thank you for the invitation.

I will deliver my remarks in English, but will be happy to answer your questions in the two official languages.

I will skip over an introduction that lays out the infiltration and co-optation of Canadian research by Chinese defence intelligence, national security and dual-use technology entities, but rest assured that the public record shows that it is deep and vast. In some cases, Canadian institutions and researchers know full well that their Chinese interlocutors are highly problematic, while in others they are unwitting participants.

Tax dollars, public research funding and public universities have for years been leveraged systematically to support and enable research and to use technology that benefits hostile authoritarian states that seem to undermine Canada’s democratic institutions, electoral processes, economic prosperity, national security and fundamental values, as well as international multilateral institutions and so forth.

The government purports to have a values-based foreign policy, yet, for over 17 years, its own research dollars and institutions have been used by hostile states to advance nefarious purposes that run counter to those very values. This is not a random distribution problem. The problematic research partners and methods of infiltration and co-optation have been a matter of public record for at least five years, as have key areas of sensitive research.

At the same time, dithering by the federal government on a coherent and systematic approach and framework to contain this problem is anecdotally causing some scholars to be excluded from opportunities merely by virtue of having a Chinese surname. Contrary to the Prime Minister’s claims that government action might have racist consequences or overtones, it is precisely the government’s inaction that is having racist consequences by creating widespread uncertainty.

Conversely, any scholar who has family in China, who works with former colleagues in the PRC or who visits China would be vulnerable, as is naturally the case with most scholars with relations to China. Although the committee’s focus is on the federal government’s role, this domain requires close and extensive collaboration among the federal government, the provinces and research institutions, with robust and resolute federal leadership to ensure certainty and national coherence. To this end, the federal government must not succumb to the temptation to take the easy way out by taking a narrow approach. This would be a serious mistake. Only a comprehensive approach to research security will be effective and meaningful.

First, on sensitive research areas, the government needs to flag high-risk research areas, notably those that could give rise to dual-use technology. Conspicuously absent from the motion that informs the committee’s hearings, for instance, is computing or advanced materials manufacturing and critical minerals, which would capture research on electric vehicles.

Two, it needs to be country-agnostic. Once sensitive research areas have been identified, the approach should be country-agnostic and encompass not just China but hostile authoritarian regimes more broadly, including Russia and Iran.

Three is listed entities. The government must muster the courage to list problematic entities, which includes about 200 Chinese institutions and companies, but also entities in Russia and Iran, for instance. Researchers must have clarity about which affiliations are problematic.

Four, identifying sensitive research areas, problematic countries and actual entities shifts some of the burden for research security to the researcher, who should be required to certify in good faith that either none of these apply to the PI and application, or if they do, the researcher should be required to submit a comprehensive research security plan that explains in detail the risks and the mitigation strategies. Inadequate risk mitigation plans should be grounds for rejection. Research security plans must exercise due diligence to ensure that research does not end up in the wrong hands and to provide additional safeguards, including annual audits and possibly withholding funds to researchers and institutions.

Five is having a broad, comprehensive vetting process. Instead of looking only at direct or indirect—that is, in-kind—financial support for a project, a proper vetting process must look at the principal investigator’s collaborations holistically, notably that PI’s record of co-authored publications and other grants. Looking only at financial support on an application for a project will miss key problematic relationships. Arguments that the charter somehow works against a comprehensive vetting process are false and merely an excuse to avoid doing the right thing.

Six, the federal government has started to fund research security at Canadian universities, but there are two problems. One is that the formula used to calculate support under the Government of Canada’s research support fund is problematic. Aurora College gets $256 a year, Trent gets $25,000, and the University of Toronto gets $4.3 million. This is insufficient funding for Trent to hire research officers, on the one hand, but way too much money for the University of Toronto. Second, that effort looks largely performative. The new university research officers have thus far received little guidance and are largely performing an administrative function. They require clear guidance.

Seven, universities should be allowed and encouraged to put this new research funding towards research, best practices and awareness in support of research security.

Thank you.

Source: OurCommons.ca